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I.

INTRODUCTION

The considerable attention that the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine (CIRM) and its Independent Citizens’ Oversight Committee
(ICOC) have already devoted to framing their intellectual property (IP)

© 2006 Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti K. Rai
† Rebecca Eisenberg, Robert & Barbara Luciano Professor of Law, University of
Michigan Law School. Arti K. Rai, Professor of Law, Duke Law School. The authors
thank Krisnahu Saha for his comments and gratefully acknowledge the support of the
National Human Genome Research Institute and the Department of Energy under Grant
No. 5P50 G003391-02.

1188

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:3

policies1 is a sure sign of the growing salience of IP in biomedical research. In its Intellectual Property Policy for Non-Profit Organizations
(IPPNPO), CIRM has endorsed a “core principle” to “encourage broad
dissemination of CIRM-funded intellectual property of all types beyond
practices commonly used in 2005 to promote scientific progress.”2 At the
same time, CIRM has acknowledged competing interests that might limit
such sharing, such as bringing scientific advances to the public through
commercialization and providing a financial benefit to the State of California through revenue sharing.3 Indeed, the text of Proposition 71, the
initiative that created CIRM, explicitly sets forth these conflicting interests.4
When it comes to balancing interests, the devil is in the details. The
IPPNPO is richly detailed with respect to patenting, licensing, and the exchange of research materials. For these matters, the policy generally follows evolving standards of “best practices” for federally-funded research,
as articulated in reports from the National Institutes of Health (NIH).5 For
data sharing, however, while it states CIRM’s general expectations, the
IPPNPO barely touches upon the details.6
In recent years, data sharing has been a recurring focus of struggle
within the biomedical research community as improvements in informa1. See CIRM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
(2006), available at http://www.cirm.ca.gov/policies/pdf/ippnpo.pdf [hereinafter IPPNPO]; see also CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, POLICY FRAMEWORK
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DERIVED FROM STEM CELL RESEARCH IN CALIFORNIA:
INTERIM REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE FOR REGENERATIVE MEDICINE (2005), available at
http://www.ccst.us/ccst/pubs/ip/ip%20interim.pdf.
2. IPPNPO, supra note 1, at 25.
3. Id. at 4-5.
4. California Secretary of State, Text of Proposed Laws – Proposition 71, in CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 147 (2004), available at http://www.cirm.ca.gov/prop71/pdf/prop71.pdf [hereinafter Proposition 71].
5. See, e.g., Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Grants and Contracts
on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090
(Dec. 23, 1999), available at http://ott.od.nih.gov/pdfs/64FR72090.pdf (cited with approval in IPPNPO, supra note 1, at 12).
6. The IPPNPO embraces the lofty aspirations for data sharing set forth in a series
of recent reports from the National Research Council. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH (2006), available at
http://newton.nap.edu/catalog/11487.html#toc; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING
PUBLICATION-RELATED DATA AND MATERIALS: RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUTHORSHIP IN
THE LIFE SCIENCES (2003), available at http://newton.nap.edu/catalog/10613.html#toc
(cited in IPPNPO, supra note 1, at 26-27) [hereinafter SHARING DATA & MATERIALS].

2006]

DATA SHARING IN CALIFORNIA'S STEM CELL INITIATIVE

1189

tion technology and digital networks have expanded the ways in which
data can be produced, disseminated, and used.7 Electronic archives aggregate data from multiple sources, making it simpler and easier to share
data.8 Such sharing and aggregation facilitate observations that would otherwise be impossible, but data disclosure poses a dilemma for scientists.
Data have long been scientists’ stock in trade, lending credibility to their
claims while highlighting new questions that merit future research funding. Some disclosure is necessary in order to claim these benefits, but data
disclosure may also benefit one’s research competitors. Scientists who
share their data promptly and freely may find themselves at a competitive
disadvantage relative to free riders in the race to make future observations
and thereby earn further recognition and funding. The possibility of commercial gain further raises the competitive stakes. As information technology has advanced, and as commercial interests in biomedical research
have grown, this dilemma has become more pronounced.
The role of statutory IP law in data sharing has been limited. Data per
se are generally considered ineligible for either copyright or patent protection.9 As a consequence, the Bayh-Dole Act,10 which gives recipients of
federal funding broad discretion to seek patent rights in the results of their
federally-sponsored research, does not directly address the dissemination
of unpatentable data.11 Meanwhile, the scientific community has sought to
clarify its data sharing norms and to determine how to implement them.12
7. See, e.g., SHARING DATA & MATERIALS, supra note 6. See generally NAT’L RECOUNCIL, BITS OF POWER: ISSUES IN GLOBAL ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC DATA
(1997), available at http://newton.nap.edu/catalog/5504.html#toc.
8. Of course, integration of data from sources that use different formats can be a
problem. But software tools, such as BioPerl in the case of the genomic data produced by
the Human Genome Project, can help to address the problem. See Colin Crossman & Arti
Rai, A Brief History of BioPerl (working paper, on file with authors).
9. For a review of the limits on copyright protection of data with citations to the
relevant cases and literature, see J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual
Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 336-41 (2003). For a review of
the limits on patent protection of data, see U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Interim
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility,
1300 OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE 4 (2005), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/go/og/2005/week47/patgupa.htm.
10. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1994)).
11. Although sui generis database protection has been enacted in Europe, Council
Directive 96/9 of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77)
20, and proposed in the U.S., it has not yet been passed into law in the U.S. For a review
of U.S. database protection proposals from the perspective of the scientific community,
see J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent DeSEARCH

1190

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:3

One important focus of debate has been the extent of data disclosure
that should accompany scientific publication.13 Although disclosure of research results is the essence of publication, scientific print journals typically reveal data only in summary form. This format provides authors substantial control over access to the underlying raw data. In an earlier era,
such summary disclosures may have been necessary as a practical matter,
given scarcities of space in print media. Now, however, with the growth of
computer networks and information technology, a researcher can easily
make vast data sets available over the internet at minimal cost. Yet, a recent survey found that less than half of the most frequently cited journals
in the life sciences and medicine had policies requiring deposit of data associated with published articles.14
Debate within the scientific community over the disclosure obligations
of publishing scientists reached a fevered pitch with the publication of an
article in the prestigious Science magazine announcing the completion of
the human genome sequence by scientists at the private firm Celera.15 Although Celera made its sequence data available free of charge from its
own website, access was restricted along certain dimensions, including
quantitative limitations on the amount of data that could be downloaded, a
prohibition on redistribution, and additional limitations on commercial
users.16
The National Research Council of the elite National Academy of Sciences17 entered into the debate by forming a Committee on Responsibilities of Authorship in the Biological Sciences to examine the topic of sharing published data and materials. The Committee issued a report that
called upon authors to include in their publications or otherwise make
freely available “the data, algorithms, or other information that is central
or integral to the publication—that is, whatever is necessary to support the
velopments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793
(1999).
12. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FINDING THE PATH: ISSUES OF ACCESS TO
RESEARCH RESOURCES (1999), available at http://newton.nap.edu/catalog/9629.html#toc
[hereinafter FINDING THE PATH]; SHARING DATA & MATERIALS, supra note 6.
13. See, e.g., FINDING THE PATH, supra note 12; SHARING DATA & MATERIALS, supra note 6.
14. SHARING DATA & MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 33 tbl.2-1.
15. J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human Genome, 291 SCI. 1304
(2001).
16. Science Online, Accessing the Celera Human Genome Sequence Data, http://www.sciencemag.org/feature/data/announcement/gsp.dtl (last visited July 6, 2006).
17. Membership in the National Academy of Sciences is restricted to those scientists
who have made highly significant contributions in their fields.
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major claims of the paper and would enable one skilled in the art to verify
or replicate the claims.”18 The report further indicated that authors should
provide data “in a form on which other scientists can build with subsequent research.”19 In this regard, it specifically condemned the terms of
access to the Celera human genome sequence data as “not consistent with
the principles laid out in this report,” noting that it permitted only “static
access” for purposes of validation and not “dynamic access” for use in further research.20
Another important focus of debate has been the timing of data disclosure. The traditional trigger for data sharing in academic research is publication of research results. Large data sets, though, may not be ripe for publication in a prestigious journal until long after they are generated. Thus,
research projects that aim to create large data sets over an extended period
of time have presented special challenges for the implementation of data
sharing norms.
In the genomics context, a series of international collaborative research
efforts to create community resources for widespread use have prescribed
data sharing policies that call for disclosure prior to publication.21 In addition to facilitating prompt access to data for use in subsequent research,
some of these efforts have also aimed to defeat corresponding patents, including patents on downstream inventions resulting from the data.22
Within genomics, public research sponsors like NIH and the U.K.’s Wellcome Trust have applied normative pressure to achieve widespread data
dissemination.
Outside the context of genomics, NIH has sought to use its leverage as
a research sponsor to guide the data sharing practices of its grantees.23 In
recent years NIH has required researchers applying for more than
18. SHARING DATA & MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 5.
19. Id. at 34.
20. Id. at 48 box 3-2.
21. See, e.g., The Human Genome Program of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Science, Summary of Principles Agreed at the First International Strategy Meeting
on Human Genome Sequencing—Bermuda (Feb. 25-28, 1996), http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/research/bermuda.shtml#1; WELLCOME TRUST, SHARING
DATA FROM LARGE-SCALE BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH PROJECTS: A SYSTEM OF TRIPARTITE
RESPONSIBILITY (2003), available at http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/assets/wtd003207.pdf
[hereinafter TRIPARTITE RESPONSIBILITY].
22. See International HapMap Project, Genotype Access Registration, http://www.hapmap.org/cgi-perl/registration (last visited July 6, 2006).
23. See NIH, NOTICE NOT-OD-03-032, FINAL NIH STATEMENT ON SHARING RESEARCH DATA (2003), available at http://grants1.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOTOD-03-032.html [hereinafter NIH STATEMENT].
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$500,000 in funding to submit a plan for data sharing.24 NIH cites a compelling list of arguments in support of such sharing, including reinforcing
open scientific inquiry, facilitating new research, encouraging diversity of
analysis and opinions, enabling the exploration of topics not envisioned by
the original investigators, and permitting the creation of new data sets that
combine data from different sources. The policy stops short of mandating
data sharing, however, acknowledging the competing interest of “protecting confidential and proprietary data.”25
While these international and federal initiatives provide useful benchmarks for CIRM to consider in formulating its own approach to data sharing, they do not constrain CIRM. In the patent context, the pervasive influence of the Bayh-Dole Act on publicly-sponsored research institutions
is likely to constrain even a relatively large state-sponsored research initiative such as CIRM. These institutions actively seek and already hold many
patents on stem cell technology.26 By contrast, intellectual property rights
for data are less clearly defined and institutional practices are less standardized. Given the variability in approaches to data sharing within the
biomedical research community, CIRM may be well-positioned by virtue
of the scale of its operation and the scarcity of federal funding for stem
cell research to take a leadership role in setting the terms for data sharing
in this context.
This Article discusses data sharing in California’s stem cell initiative
against the background of other data sharing efforts and in light of the
competing interests that CIRM is directed to balance.27 We begin by considering how IP law affects data sharing. We then assess the strategic considerations that guide the IP and data policies and strategies of federal,
state, and private research sponsors. With this background, we discuss
four specific sets of issues that public sponsors of data-rich research, including CIRM, are likely to confront: (1) how to motivate researchers to
contribute data; (2) who should have access to the data and on what condi-

24. NIH, NIH DATA SHARING POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE (2003),
available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/data_sharing/data_sharing_guidance.htm
[hereinafter NIH DATA SHARING POLICY].
25. Id.
26. The most significant university patents are held by the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF). WARF holds broad patents on both embryonic stem cell
lines in general and human embryonic stem cell lines in particular.
27. For purposes of this Article’s analysis, we take these interests as a given. Thus,
we do not evaluate, for example, whether CIRM’s interest in providing financial benefit
to the State of California is appropriate. Rather, we confine our analysis to possible conflict between the various CIRM interests.
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tions; (3) what data get deposited and when; and (4) how to establish database architecture and curate and maintain the database.
II.

THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN
DATA SHARING

Neither copyright nor patent law offers federal statutory protection for
data as such. Indeed, both copyright law and patent law treat the informational content of writings and inventions as a spillover benefit for the public, while limiting the exclusionary rights of creators to something else: an
original expression in the case of copyright,28 and a product or process in
the case of patent.29
On one reading, the failure to protect information under either patent
or copyright law suggests that information gets no respect. This is the
sense that emerges from reading copyright cases like Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co.,30 in which the Supreme Court re28. Cf. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that
an alphabetized list of names and phone numbers lacked the minimum originality necessary for copyright protection, even though considerable effort may have gone into creating it).
29. Patentable subject matter is limited by statute to any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000), all generally
understood to be distinct from data or information. The subject matter boundaries of the
patent system have been diminishing in recent judicial decisions in the face of creative
claiming strategies for new technologies, particularly information technology. See, e.g.,
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d
1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Last term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of
Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 370 F.3d 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 543 (2005), vacated, reconsidered, and cert.
granted, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005), limiting the scope of its review to the question of patentable subject matter. Ultimately the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, with three justices dissenting. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite
Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2976, 2921 (Breyer, J. with whom Stevens, J. and Souter, J. join,
dissenting). Although the case ultimately failed to generate an authoritative opinion from
a majority of the Supreme Court, the numerous amicus briefs filed in support of the defendant suggest a surprising level of discomfort in the business community with the trend
toward more expansive patent eligibility. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Biotech Patents:
Looking Backward While Moving Forward, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 317 (2006).
30. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for
copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. Original, as the term is used
in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight
amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they pos-
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jected a claim of copyright in an alphabetized list of names and phone
numbers. In this story, copyright law treats information as a mere byproduct of efforts that deserve protection only insofar as they yield some other,
more creative output. Contemporary critics charge that copyright law has
failed to appreciate the importance of information as an artifact of human
ingenuity with value in its own right. In this view, as this value grows and
becomes more vulnerable to misappropriation with the expanding capabilities of IT, this limitation on legal rights becomes more anomalous.31
From another perspective, the failure to protect data may reflect a reverence for information. Information is so valuable that society will not
permit it to be monopolized. This is the sense that emerges from reading
cases about disclosure in the patent system, in which courts treat the informational content of patent applications as the public’s quid pro quo that
justifies the issuance of patents.32 In this story, disclosure of unprotected
information is not an incidental byproduct of a process that aims to motivate something more worthwhile, but is the whole purpose of the system.
We promote disclosure of precious information by rewarding disclosure
with exclusionary rights in something else.
By requiring public disclosure of information about an invention while
limiting the exclusive rights to the inventions defined in claims, patent law
sess some creative spark, “‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be . . .
[F]acts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one between
creation and discovery: the first person to find and report a particular fact has not created
the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence . . . [O]ne who discovers a fact is
not its ‘maker’ or ‘originator.’ ‘The discoverer merely finds and records.’” Id. at 345-47
(citations omitted).
31. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives to Protect Works of Low Authorship,
in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR
THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (R. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
32. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (“When a
patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated to the general public and
those especially skilled in the trade, such additions to the general store of knowledge are
of such importance to the public weal that the Federal Government is willing to pay the
high price of 17 years of exclusive use for its disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed,
will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further significant advances in the
art.”); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (“[T]he
ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new ideas and technologies into the public
domain through disclosure. State law protection for ideas and designs whose disclosure
has already been induced by market rewards may conflict with the very purpose of the
patent laws by decreasing the range of ideas available as the building blocks of further
innovation.”); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933)
(“[The inventor] may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In consideration of its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is
granted.”).
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not only fails to protect information but actually pushes it into the public
domain as a spillover.33 Yet, while the information disclosed in a patent
application is publicly available, the exclusionary rights from the patent
might still protect the patent owner from its unauthorized use if the use
involves infringing the patent claims. If an inventor discloses in a patent
application how to make and use a new mousetrap and a patent issues with
claims drawn to the mousetrap, anyone who follows the directions in the
disclosure to make and use the claimed mousetrap would be liable for infringement. A reader, on the other hand, who uses the disclosed information to problem-solve and devise a new spring-loaded device falling outside the scope of the mousetrap patent claims would not be liable, though
the patent disclosure may have been invaluable to the reader in solving his
problem. While patent claims legally constrain the use of information disclosed in patent specifications, the public disclosure of the information
may also facilitate other non-infringing uses of that information.
Patent law concerning the scope of “prior art” that is used to evaluate
the patentability of inventions has complex effects on incentives for information disclosure. The rules of patentability count all publicly available
information, including the inventor’s own disclosures, as prior art.34 Consequently, those who hope to file patent applications may be inclined to
defer disclosure of data until after filing related patent applications. On the
other hand, those who wish to defeat the potential patent applications of
their scientific or commercial rivals may disclose information early in the
hope of creating more prior art.35 The creation of patent-defeating prior art
33. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”). An inventor who
fails to file a patent application within a year of putting an invention to use loses the right
to obtain a U.S. patent, id. § 102(b), forcing inventors to choose promptly between entering into the bargain of disclosure in exchange for a patent or secrecy and loss of right to
patent.
34. Id. §§ 102-103. An inventor’s own disclosures will not defeat the novelty of an
invention under U.S. law because they do not show prior invention, knowledge, or use by
another prior to the invention date, id. § 102(a), (g), but they may nonetheless give rise to
a “statutory bar” against a patent if the disclosure occurred more than a year before the
inventor’s filing date. Id. § 102(b).
35. See Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926 (2000);
Douglas Lichtman, Kate Kraus & Scott Baker, Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System,
53 VAND. L. REV. 2175 (2000); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Promise and Perils of Strategic Publication to Create Prior Art: A Response to Professor Parchomovsky, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 2358 (2000).
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appears to have played a role in the development of disclosure rules for
some large-scale biological resource projects.36
III.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS OF SPONSORS IN DATA
SHARING

A.

Private Sponsors

Absent statutory protection, such as a patent or copyright, that survives
beyond disclosure, a standard commercial strategy for preserving the value
of data and databases has been secrecy, or more accurately, restricted access. Some owners of valuable databases permit only internal access to the
data. Others make data available only to paying subscribers under the
terms of database access agreements. Such owners may protect their databases as trade secrets, or at a minimum, under the law of contracts. Even
without having to enforce legal rights in court, database owners may exercise considerable practical control over data sharing by restricting online
access to databases to only particular internet addresses.
These strategies allow database owners to exclude free riders, and perhaps thereby capture enough value to justify creating the database. All the
same, they are wasteful from a social perspective. These strategies restrict
the dissemination of information that would have greater social value if
more widely used and that could be made freely available at minimal cost.
Restricting access leads to socially wasteful duplication as competitors
create similar databases for their own use. It encumbers data consolidation, making it more difficult to aggregate data from multiple sources to
create more comprehensive databases. Nonetheless, trade secrecy, contracts, and digital technology have an important role to play in encouraging firms to invest in the creation of databases.
B.

Public Sponsors

The case for trade secrecy and other measures is weaker for information generated at public expense. Public funding mitigates concerns about
the adequacy of incentives to generate information and makes the social
waste inherent in secrecy more troubling. While some value may be created by interactions between creators and users of data when creators control access to data, broad dissemination often better serves the mission of
public sponsors to advance science.37 Further, data disclosure can provide
36 See infra Part IV.A. and note 79.
37. Compare Ashish Arora & Robert Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property
Rights, and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004) (discussing value
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a valuable check on fraudulent research claims. This risk has, regrettably,
become salient in the recent experience of stem cell research.38 Data disclosure also provides a check against over-claiming in the political arena,
another concern for stem cell research.39
Public sponsors have an interest not only in advancing science but also
in ensuring that research discoveries made in the course of funded research are effectively disseminated and practically utilized. The BayhDole Act emphasizes this interest and aims to promote it by encouraging
grantees to patent their inventions and then to license these patents to
firms that will undertake further development and commercialization.40
The theory is that licenses, especially exclusive licenses, will provide necessary protection against competition during the risky and costly commercialization process. Although one might expect the interests of state sponsors to be similar to those of the federal government, CIRM in fact faces
more significant (and more parochial) constraints under the terms of
Proposition 71.

of customization of research inputs for particular users), with NIH STATEMENT, supra
note 23.
38. See Sei Chong & Dennis Normile, How Young Korean Researchers Helped Unearth a Scandal. . . And How the Problems Eluded Peer Reviewers and Editors, 311 SCI.
22-25 (2006).
39. See David A. Shaywitz, Stem Cell Hype and Hope, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2006,
at A21.
40. 35 U.S.C. § 200. Other interests noted in the Bayh-Dole statute include encouraging participation of small business firms in federally supported research and development (R&D), promoting collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, promoting competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future
R&D, promoting “the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in
the United States by United States industry and labor,” ensuring that the government obtains sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet its needs, and minimizing
administrative costs. Id. Federal research sponsors are not charged by statute with recovering revenues from technologies patented by grantees except in the case of inventions
made in a government-owned, contractor-operated facility (i.e. a national laboratory).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7), sponsors are directed to include in funding agreements requirements for sharing royalties with inventors and for using remaining income, after
payment of costs, to support scientific research or education. A different rule applies to
funding agreements for the operation of a government-owned, contractor-operated facility; these agreements are to require payment to the U.S. Treasury of 75% of the excess
revenues after payment of expenses if the balance exceeds 5% of the annual budget of the
facility. Id. § 202(c)(7)(E). Although the Bayh-Dole Act directs grantees to give a preference in the award of exclusive licenses to firms that agree to manufacture the invention in
the United States, if that constraint proves to be problematic, then the sponsor may waive
it. Id. § 204.
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In addition to promoting the development of stem cell therapies,
Proposition 71 identifies a number of goals that are more narrowly focused on the interests of California constituencies, including: to “[p]rotect
and benefit the California budget . . . by providing an opportunity for the
state to benefit from royalties, patents, and licensing fees that result from
the research”; to “[b]enefit the California economy by creating projects,
jobs, and therapies that will generate millions of dollars in new tax revenues in our state”; and to “[a]dvance the biotech industry in California to
world leadership, as an economic engine for California’s future.”41 Proposition 71 enhances the likelihood that the California focus of these goals
will be taken to heart by requiring California institutional affiliations for
each member of the ICOC, the committee charged with governing
CIRM.42
Of course, it is not at all surprising that a California voter initiative that
appropriates $3 billion in research funding would promote the interests of
California constituencies. Indeed, in the Bayh-Dole Act, the federal government made a similar move to promote the interests of U.S. firms by
directing recipients of U.S. research funding to give preferences for exclusive licenses to firms that would manufacture in the U.S.43 These strategies allow taxpayers to capture more of the benefits of tax-funded programs. To the extent that spillovers to non-local interests limit incentives
for governments to invest in research and development (“R&D”), such
strategies may be necessary to encourage government-funded R&D.
Nonetheless, state-focused preferences in the management of intellectual property are more limiting than national preferences, and thus are
more troubling. If state-sponsored R&D initiatives become more prevalent, a proliferation of local preferences could threaten to balkanize valuable IP among the states, making it difficult for firms to collect the rights
needed to move forward with product development. Even a single statesponsored research initiative such as CIRM could significantly restrict dissemination through local preferences if it controls access to broad, crosscutting technologies, like stem cells, that may have implications for a
range of problems.44
41. Proposition 71, supra note 4, at 147.
42. Id. at 147-48; California Stem Cell Research and Cures Act, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 125290.20(a) (2006).
43. Note, though, that if that constraint proves to be problematic, the sponsor may
waive it. 35 U.S.C. § 204.
44. It is interesting to compare the interests of state research sponsors in furthering
the interests of local constituents with the interests of private research sponsors in furthering the interests of shareholders. Private sponsors are unlikely to care whether the money
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Moreover, in contrast to the Bayh-Dole Act, Proposition 71 directs
CIRM to recoup revenues for the California state treasury.45 This revenue
goal is in tension not only with the goal of ensuring widespread dissemination of research results, but also, to a lesser degree, with the goal of commercialization. To the extent that product developers are expected to return money to the state treasury, such a requirement acts as a tax on commercialization.
Although the Bayh-Dole Act and Proposition 71 focus on patent rights
in technologies emerging from sponsored research, data sharing in the
context of sponsored research poses similar tradeoffs between capturing
value for political constituencies and promoting scientific progress.
IV.

SPECIFIC CHALLENGES FOR CIRM

The challenge for CIRM is to capture an adequate return for its constituents on its investment in stem cell research without unduly limiting its
overall social value. In examining this challenge, we address four highly
interdependent issues that any effort to promote data sharing must consider:46 (1) incentives to contribute data; (2) who gets access and under
what conditions; (3) what gets deposited and when; and (4) database architecture, maintenance, and curation. Throughout our discussion, we draw
upon the experiences of prior database initiatives, particularly those at the
federal level, which have attempted to promote widespread dissemination
and sharing. In the absence of information on the specific research CIRM
is likely to fund, we make these observations at a relatively high level of
generality.
A.

Incentives to Contribute Data

In order to be effective, data release policies must give scientists clear
incentives to contribute their data. This Section focuses on incentives in
they are making emanates from activity in California or in Massachusetts, and are therefore less likely to restrict dissemination on the basis of geography. On the other hand,
private sponsors may be less likely than state counterparts to disseminate information in
ways that benefit the public but do not benefit their own bottom lines. CIRM might be
content to spend money in ways that mean more medical treatments and more jobs for
California voters even if no money flows back to the state coffers, but commercial firms
that are obligated to return value to shareholders cannot afford to be so public-spirited.
45. Proposition 71, supra note 4, at 147.
46. For purposes of this article, we put to one side thorny problems regarding privacy that might be raised by data associated with personally identifiable information. We
will assume that data involved in stem cell research would not trigger concerns about
personally identifiable information or that the data could be effectively de-identified to
address such concerns.
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two somewhat distinct contexts: centralized data production projects and
more decentralized, investigator-driven science.
As a general matter, incentives are necessary because most rewards in
research science, including academic appointments, promotion, and grant
funding, depend on a record of frequent publication. Scientists may perceive sharing data, even after an initial publication, as providing advantages to competitors in the race to generate further publications. Scientists
may also be reluctant to share data because of involvement in commercial
activities. Sharing may imperil patent applications or destroy trade secrecy. Emerging evidence reveals that some research communities in the
life sciences are reluctant to share data even after publication. For example, a survey conducted by Eric Campbell and his colleagues found that
47% of academic geneticists who had made a request to another academic
had been denied access to data or materials associated with a published
article at least once in the preceding three years.47 Scientific competition
and commercial involvement were both important predictors of refusal to
share.48
Although NIH now requires grant applicants to include a data sharing
plan in grant applications exceeding $500,000 per year,49 so far it has done
little to enforce compliance. If CIRM wants its grantees to share data, it
should consider mechanisms for ensuring compliance from the outset in
order to offset the powerful incentives that scientists face to withhold access to data. Mechanisms might include rewards for compliance or sanctions for noncompliance, such as loss of continued funding. A possible
reward might involve privileged access to data analysis tools for those
who contribute data to an archive. CIRM could also track downloads of

47. Eric Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence from a
National Survey, 287 JAMA 473, 477 (2002). The Campbell study did not distinguish
between data and tangible materials. Because one important impediment to sharing identified by the study—the effort and financial cost associated with replication and transfer,
id. at 478, —is much lower for data than for tangible materials, the study may overestimate impediments to data disclosure. Cf. John Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents
and Materials Transfers, 309 SCI. 2002 (2005) (indicating that problems in transfer of
tangible materials appear to have risen since Campbell’s study, but not addressing the
question of data). Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, a series of workshops and reports
emanating from the biomedical research community confirms a growing perception of
departures from the principle of data sharing upon publication.
48. See Campbell, supra note 47, at 478.
49. See NIH DATA SHARING POLICY, supra note 24.
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data from a centralized archive and give special acknowledgements or
other rewards to scientists whose data was downloaded frequently.50
It may be easier to achieve compliance with a data sharing plan within
a tightly knit community of scientists. For example, at the height of the
Human Genome Project (HGP), the five major production labs that contributed large amounts of sequence to the public GenBank database teleconferenced on a weekly basis.51 In this environment the normative pressure to comply with data disclosure—even pre-publication disclosure—
was unusually strong. Some data users from the HGP and other community resource projects have also argued that widespread data availability
was the quid pro quo for the major centers receiving large sums of money
to complete these projects without undergoing peer review of each individual portion.52 CIRM may be able to create similar normative pressure
to comply with data disclosure obligations if it funds large-scale, centralized data production.53
It bears emphasis, though, that researchers in the HGP were motivated
not only by a public-spirited desire to make data quickly available (without any background patents on associated material)54 but also by a competitive desire to outdo rival private sector efforts. Measures of the volume
of data accumulating in GenBank served as a conspicuous marker of accelerating productivity for the HGP. Public availability served as a salient
point of distinction from the proprietary databases of commercial rivals.
50. Although rewards of this sort might not be as attractive as preserving exclusive
access so as to mine the data for additional publications (particularly if university tenure
and promotion committees continue their current practice of considering publication to be
the primary benchmark of success), they might provide some incentive.
51. JOHN SULSTON & GEORGINA FERRY, THE COMMON THREAD: A STORY OF SCIENCE, POLITICS, ETHICS AND THE HUMAN GENOME 193 (2002) (discussing the Friday
conference calls that took place among the “G5” to coordinate activities).
52. Steven Salzberg et al., Unrestricted Free Access Works and Must Continue, 422
NATURE 801 (2003) (correspondence from bioinformaticians arguing that obligations of
scientists in large-scale data production centers differ from those of traditional scientists).
53. For example, CIRM might fund a group of centers to produce data on gene expression at different stages of stem cell differentiation.
54. In February 1996, scientists from the major sequencing centers in the HGP explicitly disavowed patenting. Eliot Marsh, Data Sharing: Genome Researchers Take the
Pledge, 272 SCI. 477, 477 (1996). NIH followed up with an April 1996 policy statement
strongly discouraging patenting by HGP grantees. National Human Genome Research
Institute, NHGRI Policy Regarding Intellectual Property of Human Genomic Sequence—
Apr. 9, 1996, http://www.genome.gov/10000926. Though it may be in some tension with
Bayh-Dole, this “no patenting norm” has also been part of subsequent NIH-sponsored
“community resource” projects. See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Public
Domain: Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 289 (2003).
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Public access helped to justify continued public support for a project that
appeared to duplicate work being done in the private sector. Moreover,
rapid data availability might have been expected to frustrate commercial
rivals by creating prior art to defeat future gene sequence patents.55 Rapid
public disclosure also undermined the viability of private sector business
models that entailed charging license fees for database access. Although
they were able to raise investment capital to create their databases, private
sector rivals were ultimately not able to survive in the database business.56
Given its mandate to “[a]dvance the biotech industry in California to
world leadership, as an economic engine for California’s future,”57 it
seems unlikely that CIRM would want to drive out private sector data producers in any large-scale data production efforts that it might fund. CIRM
might, therefore, count impediments to private R&D as a cost to weigh
against the benefits of a public domain approach to research inputs like
data. A public domain approach eliminates the significant costs that are
likely to be associated with negotiating access, but it also imposes some
costs of its own. In addition to making public funding necessary in many
cases, aggressive versions of a public domain approach may undermine
the types of small firms that tend to provide specialized research inputs in
the marketplace. To the extent that these foregone market incentives for
innovation by specialized firms are superior to the incentives that operate

55. Although raw genomic data would not undermine claims to specific genes of
identified function, annotated data might do so. A major goal of annotation is to identify
coding regions in the genome and add information about the function of the protein for
which the region codes. A recent empirical study suggests that at least 20% of human
genes are in fact covered by patents; some genes are covered by multiple patents. See
Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome,
310 SCI. 239 (2005). The extent to which these patents are valid over the prior art is unclear.
56. The major private sector rival to the public database, Celera Genomics led by
Craig Venter, was ultimately unsuccessful in its efforts to charge for its database and released its data into the public domain. Emma Marris, Free Genome Databases Finally
Defeat Celera, 435 NATURE 6 (2005). Although public availability of the human genome
avoids the potentially crippling costs that might have been associated with negotiating
access, and is thus a welcome development, the presence of a private sector rival had
some benefit. The private sector effort arguably provided the competition necessary for
the public sector to work efficiently. In particular, private sector competition may have
been the catalyst necessary to overcome the public sector’s resistance to the whole genome shotgun sequencing approach, a methodology that has proved to be successful. See
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Richard Nelson, Public vs. Proprietary Science: A Fruitful Tension?, 131 DAEDALUS 89 (2002).
57. Proposition 71, supra note 4, at 147.
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in large, vertically integrated firms or in the public sector,58 that cost may
be significant.
Unlike the HGP, most community resource projects in genomics have
not sought to drive out private sector competitors. These projects may
therefore provide a more appropriate model for CIRM. Non-HGP community resource projects have, of course, lacked the incentives for disclosure
provided by a race with a high-profile private sector competitor. They
have made up for the absence of such incentives, however, by explicitly
seeking to preserve some of the rewards of publication for scientists who
contribute to public databases prior to publication. A report from the
Wellcome Trust on Sharing Data from Large-Scale Biological Research
Projects: A System of Tripartite Responsibility proposes that producers of
database resources publish a project description at the beginning of the
project describing their plans.59 These project descriptions should provide
for production, analysis, and release of the data and give a citation for referencing the sources of the data.60 The Wellcome Trust report not only
admonishes data users to cite the proper reference source but it also urges
them to “recognize that the resource producers have a legitimate interest in
publishing prominent peer-reviewed reports describing and analyzing the
resource that they have produced . . . .” Indeed, the report indicates that
data users might best “promote the highest standards of respect for the scientific contribution of others,” by discussing or coordinating their publication plans with resource producers.61 In comparable community resource
projects, CIRM could use its leverage with both data producers and the
data users it funds to encourage compliance with these suggested principles.
There is an obvious tension between preserving opportunities for those
who disclose data to publish their own future analyses and allowing outside users full access to the data. Unlike the Wellcome Trust report, which
does not endorse explicit delays on publication by outside data users, some
community resource projects have tried to restrict publication. One example is the Genetic Association Information Network (GAIN),62 a publicprivate partnership of the NIH and several private firms, currently Pfizer,
58. See Arora & Merges, supra note 37; Ashish Arora et al., Markets for Technology and Their Implications for Corporate Strategy, 10 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 419
(2001).
59. See TRIPARTITE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 21.
60. Id. at 3-4.
61. Id. at 4.
62. Foundation for the NIH, GAIN Program Home Page, http://www.fnih.org/GAIN/GAIN_home.shtml (last visited Aug. 3, 2006).
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Affymetrix, and Abbott Laboratories.63 GAIN aims to understand the
complex set of genetic factors influencing risk for common diseases by
conducting a series of whole genome association studies that employ samples from patients with such diseases.64 The GAIN publication policy
gives contributing investigators a period of nine months during which they
have the exclusive right to submit publications based on their data.65 At
the same time, the policy gives approved users, who sign a restrictive
agreement, access to the data during this period.66 CIRM may need to consider whether the type of formal restriction on publication adopted by
GAIN unduly favors initial producers of data relative to subsequent users.
In any event, the model adopted for community resource projects in
genomics is likely to be inappropriate for decentralized, investigatorinitiated work. Detailed information about the characteristics of all available stem cell lines, for example, is likely to emerge not from a top-down
data production effort, but rather from decentralized contributions of individual labs. Stem cell scientists would presumably generate such information as they worked with, and published on, particular lines. A database
that accumulated such information, which some stem cell scientists have
proposed,67 might include details of derivation, genetic details, and results
indicating pluripotence and antibody markers.
For such work, the federally funded Protein Data Bank (PDB) may be
a better model. In 1971, a group of crystallographers established the PDB
as a centralized repository for three-dimensional protein structure data.
Deposit of structures, though, did not begin in earnest until the 1980s, as
the community began to see collective advantages of deposition. In 1989,
the International Union of Crystallography (IUCr) reinforced community
views by calling on researchers to deposit data once they submitted for
publication a research article based on the data.68 Actual data release,
63. See Foundation for the NIH, GAIN Program Partnerships, http://www.fnih.org/GAIN/Partnerships.shtml (last visited Aug. 3, 2006).
64. See Foundation for the NIH, GAIN Program Overview, http://www.fnih.org/GAIN/Background.shtml#Program (last visited Aug. 3, 2006).
65. Foundation for the NIH, Policies and Procedures: GAIN Publication Policy,
http://www.fnih.org/GAIN/policies.shtml#Publication (last visited Aug. 3, 2006) [hereinafter GAIN Publication Policy]; Foundation for the NIH, GAIN Data Use Certification
Terms of Access, http://www.fnih.org/GAIN/documents/Data_Use_Certification.pdf, ¶ 6
(last visited Aug. 3, 2006) [hereinafter GAIN Terms of Access].
66. GAIN Publication Policy, supra note 65.
67. Krishanu Saha, Navigating to the Right Stem Cell Line (working paper, on file
with authors). A preliminary version of such a database is currently available at The Stem
Cell Community, http://www.stemcellcommunity.org (last visited Aug. 3, 2006).
68. SHARING DATA & MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 74-75.
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however, did not have to be immediate: the IUCr allowed researchers to
request a one-year hold before public release of the data by the database.69
IUCr justified this one-year hold as a reward for the difficulties in determining protein structure. As these difficulties decreased, leaders within the
community began to call for immediate release of data upon publication.
In 1999, the NIH announced a policy of data release upon publication for
its grantees.70 Major scientific journals such as Science and Nature now
require data deposition in PDB as a condition of publication.71
In contrast with recent community resource projects in genomics, the
PDB effort does not have a prohibition on patenting. Although the PDB
does not keep track of background patents,72 protein structure data could
be associated with background patents on the gene, protein crystal, or perhaps even on a computer model of a protein binding pocket that purports
to allow the investigator to test drug candidates.73 In a decentralized project such as PDB, a prohibition on patents might have served as a significant disincentive to scientific participation.
The PDB story exemplifies cooperation between scientific leaders in
the protein crystallographic community and research sponsors over several
decades to make data deposition an essential aspect of publication.74 A
similar combination of sustained sponsor pressure and leadership from key
leaders in the stem cell community may also be critical in order for data
sharing in routine CIRM-funded work to succeed.
B.

Access: By Whom and Under What Conditions

Incentives to contribute are also likely to be affected by scientists’ perceptions regarding who may access their contributions, and under what
conditions. The issue of access is an important one, both for ensuring
maximum benefit from CIRM-sponsored research and for determining
how CIRM, and the state of California more generally, reap returns on
their investment.
A pure public domain approach to scientific resources would place no
restrictions on who could seek access or on what they could seek. In the
69. Id. at 75.
70. Id. at 76.
71. See Science, Database Deposition Policy, http://www.sciencemag.org/about/authors/prep/gen_info.dtl#datadep (last visited Aug. 3, 2006).
72. Telephone Interview with Helen Berman, Professor, Department of Chemistry
and Chemical Biology, Rutgers University, in Piscataway, N.J. (Mar. 2, 2005). Professor
Berman is a leader of the PDB community.
73. Although the last category of patent appears quite close to a patent on data, the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office has issued such patents.
74. Interview with Helen Berman, supra note 72.
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area of publication-related biomedical materials, CIRM has already departed from a pure public domain approach in favor of a policy that favors
California researchers. The CIRM IPPNPO requires grantees to share
biomedical materials described in published scientific articles within 60
days of receiving a request for such materials. But the IPPNPO appears to
limit grantee obligations to those who are seeking the materials for “research purposes in California.”75
CIRM might similarly choose a tiered approach to data access in order
to benefit various constituents. It might, for example, permit access by: (1)
CIRM-funded nonprofit researchers only; (2) all CIRM-funded researchers; (3) all California researchers; (4) all stem cell researchers who had
contributed their own data (and/or agreed to contribute their own annotations/improvements to the database); or (5) all stem cell researchers. Certain categories of researchers could be excluded altogether or could be
given access under restrictive conditions. CIRM could require for-profit
institutions, or non-California institutions, to pay for access. Non-price
methods of tiering, such as early access by certain favored categories of
researchers, could favor preferred groups while still permitting broad access.
Providing preferential access to CIRM-funded researchers, or to researchers based in California, could promote Proposition 71’s goal of
stimulating the California economy. Charging for-profit institutions for
access may promote its goal of direct returns to the California budget. Furthermore, giving preference to those who themselves contribute data,
whether through initial contributions or through improvements or annotations to the initial contribution, could provide an additional incentive to
contribute.
These benefits come at some cost though: the more conditions CIRM
places on access, the more potential investigators are excluded. Moreover,
because data are not protected by intellectual property rights, contractbased access must specifically include restrictions against the possibility
of dissemination to third parties. Thus, in order for any contractual restrictions to be effective, they must include a restriction on further dissemination.
Again, recent experience with publicly funded genomics databases
provides a useful background for examining the costs and benefits of restricting access. In the case of the HGP, data were released into the public
75. IPPNPO, supra note 1, at 16. Similarly, the IPPNPO restricts its requirement
that CIRM-funded patents materials be made available for research purposes to “California research institutions.” Id.
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domain without restriction. The public domain approach was chosen over
the objection of some public sector scientists who did not view creating
prior art as the best weapon for defeating proprietary claims. Because the
data were freely available, those who accessed the data could blend it with
their own privately-held information and make the combination proprietary.76 These scientists suspected that Craig Venter, the major private sector challenger to the HGP, had adopted this approach.77
The frustration of these public sector scientists appears to have influenced the approach toward data sharing in subsequent community resource projects. For example, the International Haplotype Map (HapMap)
project, which receives funding from both the NIH and the Wellcome
Trust, initially took a very different approach to data release. In that case,
the raw data on single base DNA variations, also known as single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), were not released into the public domain.
Rather, they were made available via a clickwrap license explicitly modeled on the General Public License (GPL) used by open source software
developers.78 Until December 2004, when the license restrictions were
lifted, the license prohibited licensees from combining the data with their
own so as to seek product patents on combinations of SNPs known as haplotypes.79
The HapMap experience illustrates some of the difficulties involved in
adapting the GPL to the release of biomedical research data.80 First, the
76. SULSTON & FERRY, supra note 51, at 211-13.
77. There is some controversy over the extent to which the Venter project actually
relied on the public data. Compare Robert H. Waterston et al., More on the Sequencing of
the Human Genome, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3022, 3024 (2003) (claiming that Celera’s assembly is “appropriately viewed as a refinement built on the HGP assemblies”)
with Mark D. Adams et al., The Independence of Our Genome Assemblies, 100 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3025, 3026 (2003) (claiming that Celera produced an “independent
assembly” and that HGP contribution to the structure and content was minimal).
78. International HapMap Project, Public Access License–Version 1.1, Aug. 2003,
http://www.hapmap.org/cgi-perl/registration [hereinafter HapMap License]. The HapMap
License includes an acknowledgement to the GNU General Public License of the Free
Software Foundation. Id.
79. See id. ¶ 2(b)(i) (“[Y]ou shall not file any patent applications that contain claims
to any composition of matter of any single nucleotide polymorphism (‘SNP’), genotype
or haplotype data obtained from the Genotype Database or any SNP, haplotype or haplotype block based on data obtained from the Genotype Database.”) Haplotypes are SNP
clusters that are inherited together. Haplotypes associated with particular phenotypes can
be used as markers for diagnostic tests and drug targets. See generally International
HapMap Project, What is the HapMap?, http://www.hapmap.org/whatishapmap.html.en
(last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
80. For a general discussion of “open source” approaches in biomedical research,
see Arti K. Rai, Open and Collaborative Research: A New Model for Biomedicine, in
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GPL is structured as a license to intellectual property rights. In the context
of open source software, the licensed rights consist of copyright in software, a right that has been recognized both by Congress and by the courts.
Under U.S. law, there is no comparable intellectual property right in data
to anchor the HapMap license. The HapMap license denies this difficulty,
requiring those who would access the data to acknowledge, contrary to
legal authority, that the data are protected by U.S. copyright law.81
Second, because there is no property right that survives disclosure to
those not bound by the license, in order to ensure that third parties do not
gain access to the data without agreeing to the terms of the license, the
HapMap license imposes tight restrictions on dissemination. Researchers
who accessed the data prior to December 2004 could not release the data
to anyone who was not bound by the same license terms. Most notably,
they could not include the data in publications based on the data.82
Third, the GPL is designed to preclude all downstream restrictions on
dissemination, an approach that is possible in the area of software, where
intellectual property has never been a particularly strong driver of R&D.
In contrast, in the biopharmaceutical area, patents—particularly downstream patents on therapeutics—are clearly important. The HapMap license seeks to avoid imperiling downstream patents that might matter for
future product development through the use of complex and ambiguous
license provisions. These provisions appear to prohibit product patents on

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECH
(Robert Hahn ed., 2005).
81. The license states in relevant part: “You acknowledge that the Genotype Database and the data contained in it, to which access is provided under the terms of this License, are protected by law including, but not limited to, copyright laws of the United
States . . . ”, HapMap License, supra note 78, ¶ 5.
82. International HapMap Project, Data Access Policy, http://www.hapmap.org/cgiperl/registration, ¶ G [hereinafter HapMap Data Policy] (“[While] you are free to publish
the results of those analyses [of genotypic information], you may not include in such publications the details of the individual genotypes that the Project has not yet released.”).
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SNPs or haplotypes83 but may allow for claims to certain uses of SNPs
and haplotypes.84
Finally, the enforceability of open source licenses remains a somewhat
open question. Clickwrap licenses are generally considered enforceable
contracts, so long as the licensee has had the opportunity to view and assent to the terms.85 However, if a public funding agency were to bring a
breach of contract action against a license violator, the measure of damages would be unclear. Perhaps alleged infringers of patents that were obtained or enforced in violation of the agreement could assert that the patents were invalid or unenforceable for inequitable conduct, but there is no
clear authority for such an argument. It may be that such agreements are
better understood as efforts to define norms of forbearance from enforcement of intellectual property rights within a scientific community than as
binding agreements that are themselves enforceable in a court of law.
More recent community resource projects have been less aggressive in
their approach to restricting future intellectual property claims. Like the
HapMap license, the GAIN Data Use Certification requires those who access the data to refrain from disclosing the data to anyone who is not
bound by the same agreement.86 It also urges registrants not to rely on
GAIN-supported data to seek patents on markers that might be useful in
diagnosis or identification of drug targets.87 However, the language is entirely hortatory, calling upon approved users to “acknowledge the intent”
of the GAIN IP policy, reminding them that “[i]n this spirit, it is expected”
that data and conclusions will remain freely available, and stating that
GAIN “encourages” compliance with various NIH policies that favor shar83. HapMap License, supra note 78, ¶ 2(b)(i). The policy explaining the license is
more ambiguous on the question of product patents. It suggests that patents, presumably
both product and process patents, on haplotypes with identified utility are acceptable so
long as they do not block access to the underlying HapMap Data. See HapMap Data Policy, supra note 82, ¶ E (“This licensing approach is not intended to block the ability of
users to file for intellectual property protection on specific haplotypes for which they
have identified associated phenotypes, such as disease susceptibility, drug responsiveness, or other biological utility, as long as public access to, and use of, the data produced
by the HapMap Project is preserved.”).
84. HapMap License, supra note 78, ¶ 2(b)(ii) (“[Y]ou shall not file any patent applications that contain claims to particular uses of any SNP, genotype or haplotype data
obtained from the Genotype Database or any SNP, haplotype or haplotype block based on
data obtained from, the Genotype Database, unless such claims do not restrict, or are licensed on such terms that they do not restrict, the ability of others to use at no cost the
Genotype Database or the data that it contains for other purposes.”).
85. See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
86. GAIN Terms of Access, supra note 65, ¶ 4.
87. Id. ¶ 5.
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ing.88 Further, the document explicitly “recognizes the importance of the
later development of IP on downstream discoveries, especially in therapeutics.”89
The less rigid language used in the GAIN Data Use Certification
makes good sense given the difficulty of determining ex ante just which
patents will prove necessary to preserve economic incentives for product
development in the biopharmaceutical area.90 A small diminution in the
incentives of public sector database contributors to contribute their data is
a price worth paying for a safeguard against destruction of future incentives for product development.
In sum, experience with restrictions on access to genomics databases
suggests that contract-based restrictions on access can provide incentives
for data producers to contribute their data. Indeed, data producers may
strongly prefer such restrictions. Contractual restrictions, however, are
very difficult to enforce without sacrificing dissemination. Contractual
restrictions on future intellectual property rights may be particularly illadvised in an area as sensitive to patents as biomedical science.
C.

What Gets Deposited and When

A third set of questions concerns what data get deposited and when.
One benchmark is the standard set in the National Research Council report
Sharing Publication-Related Data and Materials. This report calls for disclosure of “whatever is necessary to support the major claims of the paper
and would enable one skilled in the art to verify or replicate the claims.”91
Tying disclosure obligations to publication has implications for both the
scope and timing of disclosure obligations.
With respect to the scope of disclosure, the focus on verification and
replication of publication claims allows for evolution in standards of disclosure over time within a given scientific community. In the case of the
Protein Data Bank, for example, requirements for what gets deposited
have evolved. Initially, crystallographers only deposited atomic coordinates. However, scientists subsequently determined that atomic coordinates did not necessarily provide all the information necessary for verification and improvement. Today there is general agreement that structural

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Alternatively, it may reflect a recognition that simple release of GAINsupported data is all that is necessary to invalidate marker patents.
91. SHARING DATA & MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 5.
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factors—the raw information from which researchers derive coordinates—
should also be deposited.92
The issue of when data should be deposited is a critical one. As already noted, for community resource projects in genomics, the public
sponsors have generally required immediate, pre-publication deposit.93
CIRM should recognize, though, that pre-publication release of data is
highly unusual in science. The data release policies for community resource projects in genomics offer a precedent for centralized data production projects that CIRM might fund. However, it is unlikely that scientists
could be persuaded to agree to pre-publication release beyond that context.
As discussed earlier, the current structure of investigator-driven academic
science virtually requires some level of secrecy prior to publication. In this
context, pre-publication data release might even be undesirable because it
would interfere with the incentives provided by the reputation benefits attached to publication.
On the other hand, a significant drawback to the current system of tying data release to publication is that negative data often remain undisclosed. CIRM might be able to address this bias in a data release policy by
requiring disclosure not only of the data that leads to the publication but
also of any negative data that emerge along the way. Indeed, because
negative data can prove highly useful for future researchers, CIRM would
perform a valuable service by establishing data archives that require deposits of both positive and negative data.
If disclosure obligations are not tied to publication, it becomes necessary to establish another marker to signal when data are ripe for release. In
the case of the HGP, the community originally determined that sequence
assemblies of 1-2 kilobases or greater should be released. However, when
the community switched in part to a different sequencing methodology
that did not assemble completed sequences until much later in the project,
it determined that tying data release to assembly was no longer appropriate. In 2000, NIH extended its release policy to include submission of raw
sequence traces.94
Finally, it bears emphasis that the distinction between pre-publication
data deposit and data deposit upon publication rests on a model that currently prevails in the life sciences in which peer review precedes print

92. Interview with Helen Berman, supra note 72.
93. National Human Genome Research Institute, Reaffirmation and Extension of
NHGRI Rapid Data Release Policies: Large-Scale Sequencing and Other Community
Resource Projects—February 2003, http://www.genome.gov/10506537.
94. See id.
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publication. This distinction may become less important in the future if the
life sciences community adopts a model similar to that used in the physics
community, as well as in other scholarly communities, where Web-based
publication precedes peer review.
In the near term, publication is likely to provide a useful benchmark
for both the timing and scope of data disclosure for most CIRM-funded
research. This approach is less likely to disrupt traditional scientific rewards and incentives than a system of pre-publication disclosure, making
it easier to persuade scientists to comply. It has the further advantage of
allowing CIRM to rely on the judgments of journal editors and peer reviewers in determining when research results are ripe for disclosure.
D.

Database Architecture, Curation, and Maintenance

A last set of issues relates to database architecture, curation, and maintenance. Such issues tend to be neglected, but they are critical to the longterm survival and usefulness of databases.
A centralized, Web-based data archive is the most obvious platform
for data sharing. In biomedical research, some of the most prominent databases—GenBank for DNA sequence data and the PDB for 3-D structure
data—are centralized repositories. A major advantage of a centralized database is that data are prominently available in a uniform, readily searchable format. Disadvantages include cost and the need for agreement on
data standards. Even with these disadvantages, a centralized database is
probably most appropriate for data that are most useful when aggregated,
such as data on gene expression or on the characteristics of available stem
cell lines.
Another format that might prove useful for certain projects is a federated approach, in which data are maintained and controlled at the level of
the individual lab but can be integrated across databases. Federated systems might be useful even in situations where the core data reside on a
central computer or server. For example, the distributed annotation system
(DAS) that can be used on genomic data deposited at EMBL, the European counterpart to Genbank, allows those who want to annotate genomic
data to do so on their own servers. Other DAS users can then designate
which server annotations to layer over the core data.95

95. Telephone Interview with Lincoln Stein, Researcher, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, in Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y. (May 13, 2005); see also Lincoln D. Stein, Sean
Eddy & Robin Dowell, Distributed Sequence Annotation System, http://biodas.org/documents/rationale.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2006).
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The format that is probably least useful, but may nonetheless be sufficient for certain investigator-initiated projects, is posting on a local lab
server. This format maximizes investigator control over the data but is
relatively inconvenient for access by other users.
For all three types of databases—centralized, federated, and local—
funding for ongoing curation and maintenance is critical. Indeed, one of
the central problems facing life sciences databases today is that funds for
curation and maintenance are often not available. A recent survey of
eighty-nine life science databases determined that fifty-one are struggling
financially: they have either been shut down for lack of funding or are being updated sporadically.96 As it considers what types of research to fund,
CIRM should be aware of the importance of providing funding for the ongoing curation and maintenance of databases that serve as important resources for the stem cell community.
V.

CONCLUSION

Proposition 71 calls upon CIRM to balance a number of competing interests, including not only scientific progress but also commercialization
of research results and financial returns to the State of California. In the
context of patenting, licensing, and tangible research materials, CIRM has
enunciated a detailed plan for balancing these competing interests. With
respect to the important issue of data sharing, however, the balance that
CIRM aims to strike is less clear. Data sharing represents a significant opportunity for a show of leadership. The federal example binds CIRM less
directly in the area of data sharing than it does in the area of patents and
licensing. At the same time, because data sharing has been a prominent
and recurrent source of tension in the global biomedical research community, CIRM has a rich history outside the state of California upon which to
draw. Prior experience with data sharing in federally-funded research and
multinational research efforts, such as the HGP and the HapMap Project,
offers both instructive examples and cautionary tales. Achieving CIRM’s
multiple goals will require considerable creativity. However, if the CIRM
data sharing experiment works successfully, aspects of its policy may
serve as a model for other states or even for the federal government.

96. Zeeya Merali & Jim Giles, Databases in Peril, 435 NATURE 1010 (2005).
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